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Evolutionary Ruminations on ‘the Value of Knowledge Intuition’1 
 
0 Introduction 
Recent debates in epistemology have paid considerable attention to the so-called 
epistemic value problems2. That is, problems that beset the value of knowledge. These 
epistemic value problems grow out of the pervasive intuition that knowledge is in 
some robust sense good (or ‘valuable’). In what ‘robust’ sense knowledge is 
considered valuable is to be explained in the next section II and until then we can rely 
on our fairly intuitive grasp of the notion. For the time being, let us call this pervasive 
intuition ‘the value of knowledge intuition’.  
We are all well-acquainted with ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ because in our 
everyday life we all very often find ourselves valuing knowledge. That is, we find 
ourselves considering instances of knowledge to be good (in some sense). Examples 
are abundant and wide-ranging from the more practical instances of everyday life (e.g. 
how to use a blender) to the highly theoretical knowledge of mathematics, philosophy 
and special sciences (e.g. the solution to Fermat’s last theorem, the semantic 
paradoxes or the Big Bang theory). 
Indeed, ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ is so pervasive that some might feel 
inclined to infer that is not simply an intuition but an intuition universally entertained. 
And given that there is no reason to think that such a universally entertained intuition 
is deceptive, they might conclude that knowledge is beyond any reasonable doubt to 
be considered valuable. Really, they might contend, there is not much logical space 
for taking knowledge to be valueless or, even worse, positively evil.  
But this conclusion is a bit too quick as anti-epistemic views are sometimes being 
expressed. One can find people (laymen and academics) voicing such anti-epistemic 
views. Sometimes you hear people asserting that knowledge is the royal road to 
depression and misery, that ignorance is bliss etc3. Such anti-epistemic views, namely, 
                                                
1      I would like to thank Matthew Chrisman for helpful comments.   
2  See L.Zagzebski (1996); T.Williamson (2000); J.Kvanvig (2003); D.Pritchard (2007, forthcoming). 
Questions of epistemic value go back to Plato’s Meno where the question whether knowledge is 
more valuable than true belief is being discussed.  
3 Compare Plato’s example in the Philebus (12d1-3) of ‘the fool who is full of foolish opinions and 
hopes and is pleased’. 
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views that question the reliability of ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ (and perhaps 
even its universal entertainment) and consider knowledge to be positively evil can, 
arguably, be found in works of literature, theology and even philosophy too4.  
Yet, although there are things to be said about such anti-epistemic views this is not 
the right place for this task. I will set aside such sceptical views about ‘the value of 
knowledge intuition’ and, subsequently, the value of knowledge itself and assume that 
they are mistaken. Thus, sceptics that do not find ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ 
compelling can stop here; or at least read it out of intellectual curiosity. The rest of the 
essay assumes that the pervasive intuition that knowledge is valuable is a reliable one. 
It correctly tracks that knowledge is in some robust sense valuable.  
Scepticism about ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ and the value of knowledge 
itself set aside, a key epistemic value problem that grows out of ‘the value of 
knowledge intuition’ is the so-called ‘core value problem’. In the light of ‘the value of 
knowledge intuition’, ‘the core value problem’ asks why knowledge is valuable at all. 
Here I concern myself only with ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ that lurks in the 
background and essentially motivates ‘the core value problem’. The rest of the 
epistemic value problems growing out of ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ won’t 
show up in the ensuing discussion as we are not here interested in addressing them5. 
What we are here interested in addressing is the question whether evolutionary 
psychological considerations could potentially inform why knowledge is pervasively 
found to be valuable. That is, why we seem so naturally and effortlessly disposed to 
entertain ‘the value of knowledge intuition’. The obvious methodological question 
then is how such an evolutionary psychological explanation of ‘the value of 
knowledge intuition’ should go.  
The first thing to be noticed is that there seems to be a psychological mechanism 
operating behind ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ and any psychological 
explanation of ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ should go through an explanation of 
the origins and function of this psychological mechanism. There is a stable, perhaps 
innate, psychological mechanism that disposes agents to find knowledge valuable.  If 
this diagnosis is right, then evolutionary psychological considerations should 
elucidate the origins and function of this mechanism, if they are to account for the 
                                                
4 Views of an anti-epistemic ilk are sometimes attributed to Romanticists like J.Rousseau and other 
anti-rationalists like A.Schopenhauer and F.Nietzsche. But as I am far from being an expert in their 
work this claim should be treated with some caution. 
5 A nice unpacking of the epistemic value problems growing out of ‘the value of knowledge 
intuition’ can be found in D.Pritchard (forthcoming: chapter 1). 
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pervasive ‘value of knowledge intuition’. But let me first explain the reasons that 
ground the diagnosis that there is a psychological mechanism operating behind ‘the 
value of knowledge intuition’. 
 Very briefly, the first reason that inclines me to think that there is a psychological 
mechanism in operation behind ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ is its pervasive, if 
not universal, entertainment. Few people, I think, will dare to question the reality of 
‘the value of knowledge intuition’ and these are bound to have some hard time 
defending their view. They are bound to have such a hard time because even sceptics 
about the reality of ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ will be forced to accept that in 
their non-philosophical moments of everyday life go on finding knowledge valuable. 
Our psychological mechanism goes on finding knowledge valuable even in the case of 
sceptics who would like to claim that ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ is not a real 
one. This Humean in character point leads to a second reason6.  
The second reason is that ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ seems to be almost 
involuntary. We seem to find ourselves valuing instances of knowledge as if this is 
something we do all the time but we only consciously realize it at our more reflective, 
philosophical moments.  Some might want to go even further here and based on these 
reasons talk in terms of an innate ‘module’ operating behind ‘the value of knowledge 
intuition’ but I need not pursue these considerations7. All I need to suggest for present 
purposes is that there is some sort of psychological mechanism operating behind ‘the 
value of knowledge intuition’. 
 That being said, my goal in this paper is to provide some tentative and exploratory 
evolutionary ruminations that could inform our understanding of the psychological 
mechanism operating behind our disposition of finding knowledge valuable. Such 
evolutionary ruminations are intriguing because by informing our understanding of 
the psychological mechanism operating behind our disposition of finding knowledge 
valuable, they could provide us with an evolutionary psychological explanation of 
why we do have this pervasive ‘value of knowledge intuition’. In other words, explain 
why knowledge pervasively strikes us as valuable.  
                                                
6 It is a Humean in character point because it parallels Hume’s( 1985) famous point about inductive 
scepticism. After giving impetus to scepticism about inductive inferences, Hume argued that as 
human agents (with the psychology we have) we are bound to go on relying on inductive 
inferences, even if we think they are irrational. 
7 Talk of modules stems from the work of J.Fodor (1983) and J.Tooby and L.Cosmides (1992), 
though, note that Fodor does not rely on evolutionary considerations as Tooby and Cosmides 
(1992) are. 
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With this much by way of introduction, we can now sketch how the discussion will 
unravel. First, in section II, I introduce ‘the core value problem’ which grows out of 
‘the value of knowledge intuition’ and explain in what ‘robust’ sense knowledge is 
found to be valuable. As I explain, knowledge is found to be valuable either 
instrumentally or finally. In other words, it is found to be good either as a means to 
action or for its own sake. I call instrumental value practical and final value pure 
epistemic value.  
Afterwards I explain that evolutionary considerations, if they are to adequately 
account for ‘the value of knowledge intuition’, they should be able to explain why we 
entertain ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ in regard to both the practical sense and 
the pure epistemic value sense. That is, why we seem naturally disposed to think of 
knowledge as practically valuable or as purely epistemically valuable. I take this to be 
a desideratum for any adequate explanation of the psychological mechanism 
operating behind ‘the value of knowledge intuition’.   
Second, in section III, I explore how evolutionary considerations could potentially 
inform our understanding of the origins and function of the psychological mechanism 
operating behind ‘the value of knowledge intuition’, that is, our disposition of finding 
knowledge valuable. Through exploring the origins and function of the psychological 
mechanism operating behind ‘the value of knowledge intuition’, I ruminate on how 
evolutionary considerations could explain why we find knowledge valuable 
(instrumentally or finally). In the end, in section IV, I overview and summarize the 
argument. 
 
1 ‘The Value of Knowledge Intuition’ and A Desideratum 
 Epistemic value problems like ‘the core value problem’ (or the so-called Meno 
problem, namely, why is knowledge more valuable than true belief) are widely 
accepted to constrain any plausible theory of knowledge8. Any plausible theory of 
knowledge must not only provide an account of the nature of knowledge but also 
must address problems of epistemic value, if it is to have any luck in the dialectical 
marketplace.  
Such a theory of knowledge can address the problems either by vindicating the 
intuitions that lurk in the background of the epistemic value problems or by 
explaining them away in an adequate manner. But no matter how these problems are 
                                                
8 See L.Zagzebski (1996); J.Kvanvig (2003); D.Pritchard (2007, forthcoming). 
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to be addressed, a theory of knowledge that does not address the epistemic value 
problems is at best to be considered incomplete. This much goes uncontested in 
epistemological circles and it is widely accepted as a legitimate dialectical constraint 
on any plausible theory of knowledge. 
An epistemic value problem is the already introduced ‘core value problem’, a 
problem that lies at the core of the debate about epistemic value because it asks the 
fundamental question of why knowledge is valuable at all. Intuitively, we find 
knowledge to be valuable and ‘the core value problem’ exactly asks why knowledge 
is valuable at all. As can be easily grasped, ‘the core value problem’ is a direct 
product of ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ because it grows out of the pervasive 
intuition that knowledge is good or valuable. The pervasive ‘value of knowledge 
intuition’ naturally gives rise to the question of why is knowledge to be considered 
valuable at all. 
 Now, as it is often noted in the literature, we seem to find knowledge valuable in 
two senses9. Like other sorts of goods (e.g. friendship or love), we find knowledge to 
be of instrumental and final value. We entertain ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ for 
both cases where knowledge seems to be instrumentally valuable and for cases where 
knowledge seems to be finally valuable.  
On the one hand, knowledge is found to be instrumentally valuable because it can 
function as a means to successful action i.e. achieving our goals like satisfying 
desires, intentions, fulfilling plans and the like. For example, if I desire a glass of 
water then, trivially, to satisfy my desire is necessary that I have the relevant means-
end knowledge that will guide me to satisfy my desire. If I am to satisfy this desire I 
must know where I can find a glass of water; otherwise, I rest my hopes for satisfying 
this desire on accidentally coming across water and this is unfortunate, as we 
surrender to the unpredictable hands of luck. 
On the other hand, we also seem to find knowledge to be finally valuable. That is, 
valuable for its own sake and not as a means for something other than knowledge 
itself. For example, we value knowledge of how to solve a differential equation, a 
geometrical problem, prove a logical theorem etc. Such instances of knowledge are 
valued for their own sake and not for something practical like the guidance they can 
offer. For, obviously, such instances of knowledge cannot offer much of practical 
guidance in any immediate or direct sense. The fact that we seem to often engage in 
                                                
9 See D.Pritchard (forthcoming: chapter 1). 
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inquiry for the mere sake of cognitive achievement illustrates the point, that is, it 
illustrates that we often value knowledge for its own sake, regardless of practical 
considerations10.  
More generally, we value practical knowledge but also value knowledge that is 
detached from the buzz of our practical lives. Whole branches of pure mathematics 
attest to that as they seem to have nothing direct to do with practicality and the same 
could be claimed about some branches of philosophy like abstract metaphysics (e.g. 
the universals debate, the reality of time debate etc.). Still, we consider such 
intellectual pursuits worthwhile and the derived knowledge valuable for its own sake, 
independently of having any direct practical purport.  
On the basis of this analysis of ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ then, we can 
distinguish between two senses of epistemic value: practical value and pure epistemic 
value. Practical value is instrumental value while pure epistemic value is final value.  
On the grounds that we entertain ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ in both senses, an 
adequate address of ‘the core value problem’ should account for both senses of 
epistemic value. Any address that accounts only for one of the two senses is to be 
considered inadequate as it would strikes us as elliptical. It would leave out of the 
theoretical picture one of the two intuitive senses of epistemic value and, at first 
instance, this would seem inadequate.  
But it is worthy of notice that it would be inadequate only for a solution that 
attempts to vindicate and not explain away the intuitions built into ‘the core value 
problem’. Approaches that do not vindicate but explain away at least some of the 
intuitions built into ‘the core value problem’ (and the rest epistemic value problems) 
would be revisionary. But ‘revisionary’ here should neither be taken to be pejorative 
nor honorific. A revisionary approach might be good or bad enough on independent 
reasons that have nothing to do with evolutionary considerations about the 
psychological mechanism operating behind ‘the value of knowledge intuition’11. 
                                                
10 Some philosophers have thought that knowledge is of final value because, exactly, it is a cognitive 
achievement. But there are problems for such a view as there are cases where, intuitively, we have 
knowledge but not a cognitive achievement and vice versa. See D.Pritchard (forthcoming: chapter 
2) for criticism of this approach to final value. 
11 Usually, what revisionary approaches to epistemic value try to do is to claim that instrumental value 
exhausts the value of knowledge and, thereby, explain away the final value of knowledge. This does 
not deny the reality of the intuition of final value, of course; what it denies is that we should take 
the final value intuition at face value. For such an approach see M.Ridge’s PP presentation ‘Getting 
Lost on the Road to Larissa’. An evolutionary psychological explanation of the value of knowledge 
intuition could lend a hand to revisionist approaches to epistemic value (like Ridge’s epistemic 
value minimalism) because this would allow such people to  explain why we have the value of 
knowledge intuition in the final value sense, though, this intuition should not be taken at face value. 
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At any event, what is to our interest here is not ‘the core value problem’ but an 
evolutionary psychological explanation of the mechanism operating behind ‘the value 
of knowledge intuition’. And if our analysis of the two senses in which we entertain 
‘the value of knowledge intuition’ is correct, then an adequate psychological 
explanation must explain both the intuition that knowledge is valued instrumentally 
for its practicality and finally for its own sake, regardless of any practical value.  
An evolutionary psychological explanation that does not explain why we are 
disposed to find knowledge valuable in both senses would leave something essential 
out and would therefore fail as an explanation. It would fail to inform our 
understanding of the psychological mechanism operating behind ‘the value of 
knowledge intuition’ and giving rise to ‘the core value problem’ (and the rest of the 
epistemic value problems). For these reasons, I take this requirement to be a 
desideratum for any adequate psychological explanation of the mechanism that 
operates behind ‘the value of knowledge intuition’. 
One last important point remains before we embark on our evolutionary 
exploration of ‘the value of knowledge intuition’. We should make no mistake about 
the theoretical scope of exploring an evolutionary psychological explanation of ‘the 
value of knowledge intuition’. The psychological question of why we pervasively 
have ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ is quite independent of the normative question 
of what the value of knowledge really is. The question I aspire to tentatively explore 
is why knowledge appears valuable to us not why knowledge really is valuable. We 
should be careful enough to discern that even if the evolutionary ruminations on ‘the 
value of knowledge intuition’ are to the right direction, this says nothing direct about 
‘the core value problem’ (and the other epistemic value problems).  
We should make no mistake to claim the opposite, namely, that evolutionary 
considerations could on their own explain the value of knowledge because that would 
mean to breach Hume’s(1985) famous ‘is-ought gap’ and commit Moore’s (2000) 
‘naturalistic fallacy’. This is what we may call ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’. Let me 
very briefly explain what ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ is about12.  
                                                
12  A similar point is found in T.Lewens (2007:159-162). Also, philosophers who have applied 
evolutionary considerations on normative domains like knowledge and meaning, such as E.Craig 
(1990:9) and D.Papineau (2003:11), are careful enough to make clear that these evolutionary 
considerations do not answer the normative questions of how we ought to use the concept of 
knowledge or what we ought to mean. As Papineau (2003: p.11) says ‘As a teleosemanticist I hold 
that our beliefs have been biologically designed to track their truth conditions. But I don't think that 
this does anything to show that they ought to do this’ (Papineau’s own emphasis). 
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As Hume (1985) has famously argued, you cannot deduce a normative injunction 
from merely descriptive facts like, among others, our evolutionary history as natural 
animals. You cannot deduce an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, as philosophers sometimes say. 
No doubt, Hume didn’t (and couldn’t) have in mind evolutionary theory, as Darwin 
came almost a century after him, but his lesson still applies.  
For example, the fact that wishful thinking, self-deception and other forms of 
doxastic irrationality may have been evolutionary advantageous for broadly pragmatic 
reasons does not mean that we ought to believe what is produced by the cognitive 
processes of wishful thinking, self-deception etc.. Equally, the fact that wrongdoing 
like lying, stealing, etc. may have been evolutionary advantageous for broadly 
pragmatic reasons does not mean that we ought to lie, steal etc.  
In parallel with Hume, Moore (2000) with his ‘open question argument’ argued 
that attempts to reduce moral properties to descriptive (or natural) properties commit 
‘the naturalistic fallacy’13. He argued that attempted reductions of moral properties to 
natural properties always meet ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions that undermine such 
attempts. Moore himself applied ‘the open question argument’ to the Social 
Darwinism of H.Spencer with devastating effect. He argued cogently that 
evolutionary considerations cannot reduce goodness. As he (2000:99) said : 
‘The survival of the fittest does not mean, as one might suppose, the survival of 
what is fittest to fulfil a good purpose - best adapted to a good end: at the last, it 
means merely the survival of the fittest to survive; and the value of the scientific 
theory[of evolution], and it is a theory of great value, just consists in shewing what 
are the causes which produce certain biological effects. Whether these effects are 
good or bad, it cannot pretend to judge (Moore’s own emphasis)’14. 
 In essence, what ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ instructs is that you cannot deduce 
what you ought to believe or what you ought to value from mere descriptive facts like 
our evolutionary history as natural animals. For this reason, even if there is a good 
evolutionary psychological explanation of why we have the pervasive ‘value of 
knowledge intuition’ this does not answer why knowledge is valuable at all. It might 
                                                
13 As W.Frankena (1939) argued, ‘the naturalistic fallacy’ is not a logical fallacy. There is nothing 
incoherent in the idea that goodness can be reduced but we haven’t yet found the right analysis. But 
philosophers who accept Moore’s ‘open question argument’ treat it not as a conclusive argument 
but as an inference to the best explanation for our ‘open feel’ semantic intuitions that undermine 
such reductive efforts. 
14  Not all philosophers accept the Moorean/Humean lesson as there are philosophers who attempt to 
show that we can reduce moral concepts and bridge the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. One example 
is M.Smith (1994). Here I will simply assume that such attempts are not successful and treat ‘the 
Moorean/Humean lesson’ as a fact. 
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overall contribute to such an answer but this will have to be part of a broader 
philosophical theory.  
More generally, the moral of ‘the Moorean/Humean lesson’ is that even if 
evolutionary considerations could inform our understanding of the origins and 
functions of our psychological and cognitive capacities, it won’t be sufficient on its 
own grounds to answer normative philosophical questions of the familiar sort: What 
we ought to value? How we ought to live? How we ought to reason? What we ought 
to do? What we ought to believe? etc. Valuable the evolutionary theory maybe, it has 
certain theoretical limits that one should be cautious enough not to transgress. 
The theoretical scope of such an evolutionary psychological explanation clarified, 
our evolutionary psychological ruminations in the next section III will attempt to 
explain both senses in which we find knowledge valuable and meet the imposed 
desideratum.  
 
2 Evolutionary Ruminations on ‘the Value of Knowledge Intuition’ 
Evolutionary psychology as such is a relatively recently founded branch of 
psychology, although its roots go back to C. Darwin’s work15. Roughly, it attempts to 
illuminate the operation of psychological and cognitive mechanisms by appeal to 
evolutionary considerations. That is, considerations invoking the idea that these 
mechanisms might have been genetically inherited to us due to the shaping hand of 
biological adaptation through natural selection. With this project in mind, 
evolutionary psychologists often resemble the mind with a Swiss army knife, namely, 
a knife containing multiple tools that can serve different purposes. Each tool’s 
function has been naturally selected under adaptation pressures to play an 
evolutionary advantageous role.  
But like the rest of evolutionary theory, evolutionary psychology’s scientific status 
is controversial as some philosophers and psychologists tend to think that 
evolutionary psychological explanations are nothing more than ‘just so stories’16. That 
is, they are theoretical stories that in reality remain highly speculative assertions with 
not much of substantial evidential support. 
As my chief purpose here is to argue from the vantage point of evolutionary 
psychology rather than argue for evolutionary psychology, in what follows I will 
                                                
15 See T.Lewens (2007: chapter 5) and D.Buller (2007) for discussion of the origins of evolutionary 
psychology. 
16 See T.Lewens (2007: 128-9) for a brief discussion of challenges to evolutionary psychology.  
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assume that evolutionary psychology could potentially inform our understanding of 
the origins and function of our psychological and other cognitive mechanism and 
processes. More generally, I will assume that it could inform our understanding of the 
functional structure of our cognitive architecture. No doubt, this is an assumption that 
needs to be argued for but arguing for this assumption here would have taken us far 
beyond from what the scope of this essay allows. 
Let us now apply evolutionary considerations on the psychological mechanism 
operating behind ‘the value of knowledge intuition’. As we made clear in section II, 
evolutionary considerations should be capable of explaining why we are disposed to 
value knowledge for both its practical value sense and for its purely epistemic value 
sense. This is what we identified as a desideratum for any adequate psychological 
explanation of the mechanism operating behind ‘the value of knowledge intuition’. 
Now, the intuition I want to tentatively press is that the psychological mechanism 
disposing us to find knowledge valuable is something that has evolved to be a 
constitutive feature of our psychological architecture. It has evolved because it has 
been evolutionary advantageous for our struggling-to-survive hunters-gatherers 
ancestors of the Pleistocene period- the era spanning 1.8 million to 10,000 years ago 
and taken to be the formative period for evolving adaptations17. The idea is that we, 
homo sapiens, so naturally and effortlessly find knowledge valuable because during 
our evolutionary history our hunters-gatherers ancestors who did entertain ‘the value 
of knowledge intuition’ were in better survival terms than those who didn’t.  
According to this idea, the psychological mechanism behind ‘the value of 
knowledge intuition’ has evolved to be a constitutive feature of our psychological 
architecture because it was chosen by means of Darwinian natural selection due to 
adaptation pressures. Our ancestors that did have this psychological mechanism could 
better adapt and cope with the challenges of their natural environment while our 
ancestors that didn’t have this psychological mechanism fared significantly worst in 
terms of adaptation to their natural environment. 
Agents equipped with this psychological mechanism could adapt and fare better 
than agents that weren’t equipped with this psychological mechanism for a very 
simple and intuitive reason. The reason is that being disposed to find knowledge 
                                                
17    It is taken to be the formative period for evolving adaptations because our ancestors spent 
only the past 10,000 years living as agriculturists and the past few hundred years living in industrial 
societies. Given that the last 10,000 years our ancestors didn’t meet much of evolutionary challenges as 
agriculturists, it is rather improbable that humans have evolved adaptations to post-pleistocene 
environments. See D.Buller (2008: 259-260) and B.Charlesworth and D.Charlesworth (2003: chapter 
1) for discussion. 
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valuable would naturally have been coupled with a desire for knowledge for its own 
sake. We usually have a desire for things we consider good and if we found 
knowledge to be good then it is reasonable to surmise that we had a desire for 
knowledge for its own sake18.  
Thus, our ancestors that had this ‘value of knowledge intuition’ and the desire for 
knowledge for its own sake, reasonably, would have channelled this desire towards 
practical knowledge concerned with how to satisfy their pressing sustenance needs for 
food, drink, shelter, clothing etc. and this would have allowed them to amplify their 
survival chances. I say they would have ‘reasonably’ channelled this desire for 
knowledge towards practical knowledge of how to satisfy basic sustenance needs 
because they would also have the instinctive desire for self-preservation. They would 
have been disposed to desire to survive and to achieve this they would have to use 
practical knowledge for the satisfaction of their basic sustenance needs.  
An evolutionary psychological explanation could again be given for our pervasive 
and almost involuntary entertainment of the instinctive desire of self-preservation. It 
is not difficult to imagine how this evolutionary explanation would go. Our ancestors 
that had this instinctive desire for self-preservation would have had better chances of 
survival from those that didn’t because they would have taken more interest in 
themselves and their survival. Agents that didn’t have the instinctive desire for self-
preservation would have had substantially less chances of survival as they would have 
taken less or even no interest in themselves and their survival. 
 This understanding of the desire for self-preservation, though, should not give the 
wrong signals. It should not be assumed that our ancestors were pretty much 
Hobbesian egoists thinking only of themselves. For, there is nothing inconsistent in 
having both the instinct of self-preservation and other-regarding instincts (altruistic 
instincts, sympathy etc.). Actually, for reasons we need not pursue here it is quite 
plausible that there may be an evolutionary explanation for the reality of such other-
regarding instincts as interpersonal cooperation and reciprocity would have often 
proved to be mutually beneficent for the agents of a community19. An agent, 
therefore, may very well have both, even though these may psychologically conflict in 
certain occasions. 
                                                
18 There can be an evolutionary explanation here for why we tend to desire what we take to be good. 
If we act on the principle of what we take to be good and action requires a desire, as the prominent 
Humean theory of action suggests, then if we didn't tend to desire what we take to be good we 
would be rendered practically paralysed and this, clearly, would mitigate our chances of survival. 
For an influential defence of the Humean theory of action see M.Smith (1994). 
19  See Z.Ernst (2008) for how evolutionary game theory approaches the phenomenon of altruism. 
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If then our ancestors had this desire for knowledge for its own sake and channelled 
to some substantial extent this desire towards practical knowledge of how to satisfy 
their pressing sustenance needs (due to the desire for self-preservation), then they 
would have significantly enhanced their chances of survival. Obviously, if you are 
motivated to amass knowledge of where abundant prey is, trees with edible fruit, what 
sort of mushrooms are poisonous, how to make traps, use a bow, skin a bear to use its 
fur etc. you amplify your chances for survival and reproduction because it is more 
likely that you will succeed to satisfy your basic needs. 
Instead, our ancestors that weren’t equipped with such a psychological mechanism 
and didn’t have such an instilled disposition to value and desire knowledge for its 
own sake would have significantly less chances of survival in the hostile environment 
of the war of nature; even if they did have the desire for self-preservation. 
Reasonably, if you are not much motivated to amass knowledge about where you can 
find clear water, fresh fruit, possible places like caves that would function as 
sheltering positions or hideouts in a case of emergency, which areas host dangerous 
predators like lions, how you can hunt, make traps, use tools etc. then your chances 
for survival are much less than one who thirsts for knowledge. 
This evolutionary explanation seems to explain why we find various instances of 
knowledge to be finally valuable, that is, valuable for their own sake without any 
direct practical purport. We have the intuition that knowledge is valuable for its own 
sake because we acquire by means of genetic inheritance the intuition and desire for 
knowledge per se, that is, for its own sake20. We find various instances of knowledge 
valuable in the final value sense because we have a psychological mechanism 
disposing us to value knowledge for its own sake and this mechanism is constitutive 
of our cognitive architecture for evolutionary reasons. It has been ingrained in our 
architecture by natural selection because of adaptation pressures. 
If this is to the right direction, then we have a nice evolutionary explanation why 
‘the value of knowledge intuition’ is often entertained in the final value sense. Still, 
this says nothing of why the value of knowledge intuition is often entertained in the 
practical value sense and, as we have diagnosed in section II, any adequate 
explanation of the psychological mechanism operating behind ‘the value of 
knowledge intuition’ should explain why we entertain ‘the value of knowledge 
intuition’ in both senses. Otherwise, it would be incomplete and thereby inadequate. 
                                                
20  D.Papineau  (2003: 73-80) makes a parallel point about how evolution could have selected a desire 
for true belief per se, as he says. 
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Perhaps, the most simple and elegant way to explain why we have the intuition that 
knowledge is also practically valuable is not to invoke any further evolutionary 
considerations, but instead invoke learning processes as these are being studied by 
cognitive and developmental psychology. That is, build on how our instinctive 
disposition to value and desire knowledge interacts with learning processes to provide 
us with the practical value sense of the value of knowledge intuition. If this idea is to 
the right direction, then our intuition that instances of knowledge are valuable in the 
practical sense is the product of interaction between our instinctive disposition to find 
knowledge valuable for its own sake and learning processes. But let us belabour the 
idea first. 
Start from what seem to be empirical facts. It seems to be a fact that from infancy 
we find ourselves oriented towards satisfying our basic sustenance needs. We cry if 
we are not fed or watered on time, if we are cold etc. One idea then is that as animals 
with biological needs from tender infancy we exhibit the disposition to channel our 
desire for knowledge towards knowledge of how to satisfy our sustenance desires. We 
exhibit such disposition because, as we have canvassed, we also seem to have the 
instinctive disposition for self-preservation. We instinctively cling on what is life-
preserving and refrain from what is life-endangering. We indulge, for example, in 
pleasure and refrain from despicable pain.  
Such practical knowledge is surely to be considered very valuable as it is 
substantial for survival. For example, if as infants our crying is efficient in making 
our parents satisfy our desires then, in some sense, we learn by association that with 
crying we can satisfy our desires and we come to value crying and deploy it when we 
see fit. This is why infants seem to be particularly spoilt as they cry when their desires 
are not readily satisfied.  
But this happens during infancy. As we grow up and acquire a first natural 
language and conceptual powers in the context of a community, we go on seeing 
practical knowledge as something good because it allows us to satisfy desires that 
often go far beyond the basic sustenance desires. Among other things, we desire a TV, 
a computer, a car and many other technological products that advertisements bombard 
us with in the settings of our modern society.  
Thus, in time we come to associate practical knowledge with value and acquire the 
unconscious habit to consider knowledge that allows us to satisfy our desires as 
something good. We come to habitually correlate practical knowledge with value and 
see practical knowledge as something valuable. Actually, the habit is so deeply 
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internalized and unconscious that it takes some philosophical reflection to 
acknowledge its underlying reality. We need to exercise our conceptual powers for 
reflection in order to acknowledge the reality of the unconscious habit of association 
between practical knowledge and value. 
If this psychological explanation is to the right direction, then explaining the 
psychological mechanism operating behind ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ is 
partly evolutionary partly cognitive and developmental. It is evolutionary to the extent 
we have an innate disposition to value and desire knowledge per se and is both 
evolutionary and cognitive-developmental to the extent we channel this desire 
towards practical forms of knowledge because of the self-preservation instinct. The 
product of this interaction is the formation of a deeply-rooted, unconscious habit to 
see knowledge as practically valuable because it allows us to satisfy our desires, fulfil 
our plans etc.  
In conclusion, Aristotle’s famous opening sentence of his Metaphysics, namely, 
that ‘all men by nature desire to know’ is quite to the point, albeit, for evolutionary 
reasons that in all evidence Aristotle, despite his teleological understanding of nature, 
was not aware of. For, although Aristotle was often saying that ‘nature does nothing 
in vain’ implying that things have a telos, a functional purpose they are made to serve 
he was still unaware that at least many of these functional purposes have been shaped 
by the mechanism of natural selection. A mechanism whose operation Darwin first 
famously made explicit. 
 
3 Preview of the Argument and Conclusion 
The goal of this essay was to engage on exploratory evolutionary ruminations on 
the origins and function of the psychological mechanism operating behind ‘the value 
of knowledge intuition’, that is, our disposition of finding knowledge valuable. Such 
an evolutionary psychological explanation would account why we human beings find 
so pervasively knowledge to be valuable. 
In the first introductory section I made explicit my goal and outlined the structure 
and content of the essay. In section II I explained how ‘the value of knowledge 
intuition’ gives rise to ‘the core value problem’ and in which senses knowledge is to 
be considered valuable, namely, instrumentally and finally. Afterwards, I explained 
than any adequate psychological explanation of ‘the value of knowledge intuition’ 
should account for both senses in which we entertain ‘the value of knowledge 
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intuition’ and took this to be a desideratum for any adequate psychological 
explanation of ‘the value of knowledge intuition’. 
In the third section, I applied evolutionary consideration on the psychological 
mechanism operating behind ‘the value of knowledge intuition’. By appeal to 
evolutionary considerations I attempted to account both for the practical sense and the 
pure epistemic sense of the value of knowledge, as the desideratum identified in 
section III prescribed. 
As I explained, we could speculate that the psychological mechanism behind ‘the 
value of knowledge intuition’ has evolved to be a constitutive feature of our 
psychological architecture because it was chosen by means of Darwinian natural 
selection due to adaptation pressures. We have been endowed courtesy of Mother 
Nature with a psychological mechanism that disposes us to find knowledge valuable 
for its own sake because such a psychological mechanism would amplify our 
ancestor’s chances for survival and reproduction. 
It would have amplified our ancestors chances for survival and reproduction 
because such disposition to value knowledge would have been wed with a desire for 
knowledge and this coupled with the instinctive desire for self-preservation would 
have channelled our desire for knowledge per se towards practical knowledge of how 
to satisfy our basic biological needs. 
This evolutionary psychological explanation seems to explain the origins and 
function of the psychological mechanism operating behind the disposition to find 
knowledge valuable. Still, this explains only why we find knowledge valuable for its 
own sake as the psychological mechanism disposes us to find knowledge valuable for 
its own sake. To account for the practical value sense of ‘the value of knowledge 
intuition’, I have appealed to the interaction between the disposition to find 
knowledge valuable for its own sake and learning processes as these are being studied 
by cognitive and developmental psychology.  
The idea was that we come to have the practical value sense of ‘the value of 
knowledge intuition’ because from infancy, due to the self-preservation instinct, we 
learn that knowledge of how to satisfy our basic biological needs is valuable. As we 
grow up and our desires multiply and go beyond our basic biological needs, we come 
to form a deeply-rooted, unconscious habit to associate practical knowledge with 
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